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Preparations by the United States Military: Strategy Development and Insights Gleaned from Past Experiences

historianand former British Army general Jonathan Bailey published "Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study" in 2006, a chapter in an edited volume on the intersection of history and the military profession. The piece centered on the reasons...

US Armed Forces Planning Ahead: Insights from Force Design and the Study of Past Lessons
US Armed Forces Planning Ahead: Insights from Force Design and the Study of Past Lessons

Preparations by the United States Military: Strategy Development and Insights Gleaned from Past Experiences

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a pivotal conflict that offered valuable insights into the changing nature of warfare. As Jonathan Bailey, a military historian, noted in his 2006 book "Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study", the war proved that a strong defense, indirect fire, and morale were all crucial variables in the new character of war.

The conflict, fought between Russia and Japan over regional ambitions, foreshadowed key aspects of World War I, including the deadly effectiveness of machine guns and artillery. It also demonstrated the importance of offensive tactics, with the Japanese adopting methods "more akin to German stormtroop tactics of 1917 rather than those of 1914."

However, Bailey argues that military organizations often ignored lessons identified after the Russo-Japanese War. For instance, Colonel John Headlam played a key role in preventing the adoption of indirect fire in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in World War I. The BEF's prewar artillery failures were not the result of the hubris of a single senior officer, but rather a systemic issue that persisted despite the war's lessons.

The US military also learned the wrong lessons from Operation Desert Storm. While some hold up the first war with Iraq as an example of doctrine done well, a deeper reading reveals a stunning amount of internal political and military chaos.

Bailey's work focuses on why militaries failed to incorporate lessons learned during the Russo-Japanese War into pre-World War I planning. He suggests that force design should encompass much more than a military deciding which new technologies to acquire. It should also include cultural conversations about whether the character of war is changing and whether innovative adjustments are necessary.

Moreover, Bailey's work reveals four main themes that militaries can consider when navigating interwar periods: technology, culture, tactical bias, and escalation. Too frequently, advocates center these arguments around new technologies and threats instead of culture.

In the modern era, the rise and evolution of new technologies, such as drones, have not drastically reshaped the battlefield or, at most, have neutralized ground forces into a static war of attrition. Drones accounted for 70 percent of casualties in the Ukraine-Russia war, but the conflict has settled into a brutal attritional fight with trench warfare, deep strategic strikes, and Russian bombing of civilians.

The US Air Force's late embrace of drones is akin to the US Army's reticence to move on from the musket, according to some theorists. The US effort against the Houthis in Yemen included tactical considerations that suddenly required the use of B-2 strategic bombers, despite no strategic demand for risking the B-2.

The Marines, Army, Air Force, and Navy have ongoing debates about force structure, new equipment, and the organization's proper role in great power competition. These service-specific cultural wars are ongoing as militaries modernize in tight fiscal environments.

The Russo-Japanese War exposed the decline of tsarist Russia, contributing to domestic unrest and the 1905 Russian Revolution. Similarly, the war's lessons continue to resonate today, influencing perceptions and strategies in the East-West relationship. Bailey argues that the failure to understand the Russo-Japanese War and ensuing conflicts still results in miscalculations between the East and West today.

The war's impact was also felt in the political sphere. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prominent naval theorist, envisioned an unavoidable clash between the East and West at the turn of the century. Events in the Middle East can drive tactical-level realities, which can influence a relatively severe escalation.

Japan's victory shocked the world and demonstrated the rise of non-Western powers in global affairs. The war's lessons serve as a reminder that the path to victory is not always straightforward and that success often depends on a complex interplay of factors, including technology, culture, and morale.

Observers, echoing Robert Jervis's research on perception, saw what they wanted to; in truth, the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated the importance of a strong defense, indirect fire, and morale in the new character of war. The war's lessons continue to resonate today, offering valuable insights for military strategists and policymakers navigating the complexities of modern warfare.

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